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Supreme Court, U.S.
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1971

J. W. HARGROVE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

-vs-

C. L. NEWSOME, et al., DEFENDANT-APPELLEES.

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

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